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THE RECOGNITION AND SUBSTITUTION
EFFECTS OF PENSION COVERAGE
The results so far suggest that covered households save more not only
by the amount of their own and their employers' contributions to
pension funds but also by a slight increase in their other saving—a
"recognition" effect. A "substitution" effect—whereby pension con-
tributions lead to a reduction in other saving and leave total saving
the same or only slightly higher—does not appear, at least for covered
households as a Substitution between pensions and other sav-
ing ought not to be perfect and would therefore lead to an increase in
a household's total saving—in this respect the substitution and recog-
nition effects are similar—but substitution implies a reduction (or at
the very least, no change) in other forms of saving, so that the slight
increase observed can be explained only by a recognition effect or its
equivalent. Even so, substitution might still occur in particular house-
holds but be offset in aggregate figures by the recognition effect in other
households. Evidence of such differential behavior among covered
households can be inferred from an analysis of factors so far ignored:
vested rights, amount of the employee's contribution, and amount of
his employer's contribution.
1. Employees' Vested Rights and Contributions
Vested rights pertain to the employee's retention of pension benefits
should he change jobs. In virtually all plans, he gets his own contribu-
tion back 2(thoughnot necessarily with accrued interest) in cash or in
deferred retirement benefits, but depending on his age and term of
1Notethat the "substitution" referred to here is not between saving and con-
sumption but pension contributions and other saving. "Full substitution" in this
sense means that the amount of total saving and of consumption each remains
unchanged.
2UnderTreasury regulations, all plans approved for tax exemption must provide
for full vesting of employees' contributions.56 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
service, he may get none, part, or all of the benefits attributable to his
employer's contribution. These benefits are worth nothing without
vesting if the employee is going to change jobs long before retirement.
Because job changes become less likely as age advances, lack of vesting
•is less important to older workers as a group, though individually they
may not think so, of course, when they face the prospect of not getting
pension benefits they previously expected. Though there may be vari-
ous characteristics of pension plans of importance to participants, vest-
ing is among the more Important ones that might affect saving be-
havior. Table 12 gives the saving ratios of covered households classified
by their reported vested rights (question 5, Appendix). The question
asked whether none, some, or all of the employee's pension would be
TABLE 12
Average Ratios of Total Other aSavingto Income of Covered Households b










Al]. 8.59.9 7.9 1.48 (±0.8) (±1.0)
50 and over 7.511.09.2
3•48
—1.8(±2.1)
Note: Figures in parentheses give the range of error at the .05 level;
s means significantly different from zero at that level.
aThatis, excluding contributions to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
b Same exclusions as for Table 6, as well as households not reporting
vested rights. Number of households under none, some, and full vest-
ing, respectively:1st row, 2,687, 2,098, and 1,202; 2nd row, 337, 478,
and 254.
cMaynot exactly equal difference between the ratios shown because
of rounding.
lost if he changed employers. We have interpreted an answer of "none"
to denote full vesting, of "some" to denote some vesting, and of "all"
to denote no vesting. "Some" vesting could mean that benefits from
the employer's contribution may be partly or wholly lost.3 "No" vest-
a Those who marked "some loss" might have fully vested plans in the legal sense
and have only meant that, if they changed jobs, further contributions to the pension
fund would cease and the retirement income would be less than if contributionsRecognition and Substitution Effects 57
ing presumably means the full loss of benefits from the employer's
contribution only. Some households may well be mistaken about their
vested rights; it is a technical subject often misunderstood. Although
our sample is fairly sophisticated and should be reasonably well in-
formed on this matter, the clarity of question 5 on vesting leaves
much to be desired, and tabulations based on it must be interpreted
cautiously.
Table 12 at first sight seems to give conflicting evidence on the
relative importance of the recognition and substitution effects. To the
extent that a pension plan is fully or partly vested, it is more likely
that the employer's contribution will be disbursed some day as retire-
ment income, which enhances the pension's value to the household,
and therefore it is more likely that other saving will be reduced, if
the substitution effect dominates, or increased, if the recognition effect
dominates. Yet we observe that the group with partly vested plans saves
significantly more in other forms than the groups with the fully and
not-vested plans. This pattern also prevails for the older workers, who
presumably pay close attention to their pension benefits. If either the
substitution or the recognition effect alone predominated, the saving
ratio would fall or rise, respectively, with the degree of vesting; the
some-vesting group would not have the highest ratio. The figures seem,
therefore, to reflect both effects.
One possibility is that a recognition effect accounts for the rise in
the ratio from no to some vesting and a substitution effect for the
decline in the ratio from some to full vesting. On this interpretation,
pension coverage sharpens households' awareness of the requirements
for an adequate retirement income and induces them not only to keep
up their other saving but to augment it. Table 12 suggests in particu-
lar that this recognition effect varies in intensity with the strength of
vested rights, since the some-vesting group has a larger saving ratio
than the no-vesting group. For all age classes, coverage without vesting
raises other saving, by almost a full percentage point (8.5 in Table 12
minus 7.7 for the not-covered group in Table 4). Some vesting produces
had continued until retirement. Or they may have meant that they would lose the
benefits of their employer's but not their own contribution, which means "not
vested" in our sense. The question was unfortunately ambiguous in distinguishing
these possibilities.58 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
a further rise of almost one and a half percentage points (9.9 minus
8.5). Hence the total recognition effect, as estimated by these figures,
is 2.2 points (9.9 over 7.7), a substantial increase in the average saving
ratio, all in addition to the employee's and his employer's contribu-
tion. The recognition effect for the older age class has the same order
of magnitude.
Coverage appears to produce its full recognition effect with some
vesting. When households achieve fully vested rights, their other sav-
ing declines, suggesting a substitution effect. Full vesting endows the
employer's contribution with a definite value in contrast to the uncer-
tain value that some or no vesting entails. A stronger effect undoubt-
edly results from definite than from uncertain benefits. If we interpret
the reduction in the saving ratio from some to full vesting as a sub-
stitution of a pension's enhanced value for other saving, the amount
of substitution for all age classes shown by the table is 2.0 percentage
points (7.9 from 9.9), which is substantial.
Since these inferences are based on average figures, individual house-
holds may deviate widely from the average pattern. Some may show
no recognition effect at all; others no substitution effect; for still others,
the substitution effect may occur but at a different point in the range
of vested rights. It should be kept in mind that the averages suppress
these deviant patterns and present only the. total effect of all.
It may perhaps be questioned why the full recognition effect of
coverage requires some vesting. Why does not coverage itself, even
with no vesting, produce the full effect? One reason may be that the
group reporting no vesting contains a large number of households for
whom coverage has little or no recognition effect. They may also be
poorly informed about their plans and, instead of leaving the question
on vested rights blank, mistakenly answered "none." It is possible that
many households, without explicit knowledge of their precise vested
rights, would presume that they would forfeit retirement benefits in
changing jobs. Without additional evidence, however, this is just a
guess.
These differences in the saving ratio due to vesting ought, if our
interpretation is correct, to be repeated in a classification of covered
households by the amount each contributes under its pension plan.
Contributions should be similar to vested rights in producing recog-
nition and substitution effects. Table 13 gives the saving ratios ofRecognition and Substitution Effects 59
various contributory groups.4 These groups pertain to the employees'
contributions; employers' contributions, which are neglected here, will
TABLE 13
Average Ratios of Total Other aSavingto Income of Covered Households b

























All 9.1 8.9 9.9 8.2 7.693 79
50 and
over10.2 9.6 10.7 8.710.2 10.2 9.3 —1.0 (±1.5)
Note: Fig.ures in parentheses give therangeof error at the .05 level;
s means significantly different from zero at that level.
a That is, excluding contributions to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
b Same exclusions as for Table 6, as well as households not reporting
amount contributed. Number of households in cols. 1 to 7, respectively:
1st row, 2,538, 1,042, 1,336, 1,781, 1,027, 4,916, and 2,808; 2nd row, 351,
158, 247, 382, 232, 756, and 614.
cHeadof household's pay, which is often less than family income
used to derive saving ratios (see footnote 4, above). From question 15A
(see Appendix).
d May not exactly equal the difference between the ratios shown be-
cause of rounding.
be analyzed in Section 2, below. The 50-and-over age class is again
shown separately as representative of the older workers who are likely
to reveal the most concern with their pension benefits.
The table does repeat the pattern found for vesting. The saving
4 Thecontributions were reported as a percentage of the head of the household's
grosspay; this is lower than total family income and makes the percentages too high
compared with pension-saving ratios shown in Table 4.
It is also possible that some respondents overstated their contributions. Most in-
dustrial plans have a break in the scale of contributions: the percentage amount is
zero or lower on the first $3,000 to $3,600 of income or so, and is higher on income
above this level. If respondents reported the percentage applied to the higher levels
of income, they overstated the percentage of total income contributed.
It may be noted that about two-thirds of the covered households reported making
contributions, in part because of the high proportion of teachers andgovernment
workers; whereas it is estimated that only 23 per cent of all employees in the United
States covered by corporate plans were making contributions in 1959. Their contri-
butions represented about 15 per cent of total dollar contributions.60 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
ratio tends to increase as the contribution rises—up to a point. When
the contribution exceeds about 5 per cent of pay, the ratio begins to
fall. This pattern is also repeated, though less strongly, by the older
age class. (The high ratio for the older class in the 7-and-over group
has a large range of error and is probably accidental.) An interpreta-
tion corresponding to that suggested for Table 12 is that the increase
in the ratio as the contribution rises to 5 per cent reflects the recogni-
tion effect, and the fall in the ratio thereafter reflects the substitution
effect. No other explanation seems plausible for the failure of the
saving ratio to fall as contributions rise from nothing to 4 or 5 per
cent of pay,5 and then to fall sharply as contributions rise further. As
shown in the far right-hand column of the table, this fall is significant
for all age classes and almost as large, though not significant, for the
older age class separately. In summary, the results suggest a recognition
effect of coverage, though one that has full force only for households
making some contribution to the pension themselves and, as shown by
Table 12, having some vested rights. Contributions over 5 per cent or
thereabouts are partly substituted for other saving.
We can estimate the amount of the recognition and substitution
effects from a breakdown by both vesting and contribution, to avoid
interaction between the two that may distort the figures for either
classification separately. Table 14 presents this cross classification for
all covered households and for these households that are also under
social security or are salaried employees of business. The latter group
excludes government workers and teachers, who, even if their plans
are not vested, may feel secure in their jobs because of civil service or
tenure and behave as though their plans were fully vested.
These figures present the same pattern with but slight differences in
magnitude from the separate classifications in Tables 12 and 13. The
saving ratio rises from the lowest to the middle contributory group
within the no- and full-vesting columns (though not within the some-
vesting column, where the ratio remains largely unchanged), and falls
again with the highest contributory group within each of the three
5Thisincrease in the ratio just misses being significant. The difference for all age
classesof the none—2.9 combined contributory group over the 3—4.9groupis
O.9(*O.9); hence the lower range of the estimated difference is zero at the .05 level
of significance.Recognition and Substitution Effects 61
vesting columns. Within each contributory group, some vesting elicits
a higher ratio than no vesting, but with full vesting the ratio declines
again. This pattern is also characteristic of the sample after excluding
households without social security in part B and government workers
and teachers in part C. If covered government workers and teachers
all behaved as though their plans were fully vested and followed the
pattern in Table 14, this might explain the relatively low saving ratios
TABLE 14
Average Ratio of Total Other a Saving to Income of Covered
Households b by Vesting and Amount of Employee's Contribution
Amount Contributed





None to2.9 8.9 10.8 7.4
3 to 4.9 10.1 10.7 8.4
5 and over 7.2 9.1 7.9
B.Households withd
SocialSecurity
None to2.9 9.0 10,7 8.1
3 to4,9 9.9 10.2 9.1




None to 2.9 9.3 11.1 8.4
3 to4.9 11.3 11.5 9.8
5 and over 8.3 11,4 8.0
a That is, excluding contributions to group pension plans and
social security taxes.
bSameexclusions as for Table 6 as well as households not
reporting vesting rights or amount contributed, and, in part A,
salaried manual workers through an oversight. Number of house-
holds, arrayed in the same pattern:
PART A PART B PART C
1,692598 321 1,672.588309 1,173440 157
316440212 281394 187 209270 89
527970588 317457332 163290 108
cHeadof household's pay (see note c, Table 13, and footnote
4, above).
dSame group as presented in Table 5, first row.
e Same group as presented in Table 7 under same heading.62 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
of this group (see Table 7) and of households without OASDI (see
Table 5), since government workers and teachers comprise the bulk of
our covered households not under OASDL
A difficulty in measuring the recognition and substitution effects is
that we do not know the dollar value to households of fully instead of
partly vested plans. In other words, there appears to be one effect for
increases in contributions and another for the enhanced value of a
pension with greater vesting, and the latter value was not measured
by our questionnaire. We may circumvent this problem by estimating
the effect of contributions on saving, holding the degree of vesting
constant. A quadratic regression functionwas fitted to the data under-





+ 9.3if some vesting
7.2if full vesting.
S/Y is other saving as a percentage of family income, and C/P is the
reported amount contributed as a percentage of head of household's
pay (not available as a percentage of household income, which would
be preferable). The regression function was made quadratic in C/P,
so that it would show both the substitution and the recognition effect.
Midpoints were used for the intervals of C/P, and the 5-and-over
class shown in Table 1.4wasdivided into two classes, 5—6.9 and 7and
over. For the latter open-end class, the midpoint was arbitrarily taken
as 7'/2.
Thenegative coefficient for the second term means that saving de-
clines as C/P rises, after first rising to a peak. The peak occurs when
C/P equals 3.3 per cent (that is, when = 0).The coefficients
for C/P and (C/P)2 differ from zero at the .05 level, though not greatly
owing to large standard errors.6 The regression function is plotted in
Chart 2 for the three vesting groups.
6 The range of error for the coefficient of C/P is dr.91, and for 10.7, at the
.05 level of significance.Recognition and Substitution Effects 63
CHART2
Estimated Relation Between Saving Ratio and Employee's Contribution by Degree
of Vesting
Ratio of other saving
to income (per cent)
11
2 3 4 5
Amount contributed as a percentage of pay
Source:Regression equation in accompanying text.64 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
The quadratic function is at best only an approximation to the sav-
ing behavior of the sample; it does not fit the data perfectly, as the
large range of error for the regression coefficients Neverthe-
less, the function brings out, even though in a crude way, the nonlinear
effects on saving of vesting and amount contributed. The nonlinearity
of these effects is evident from inspection of Table 14; the regression
is simply a convenient summary of what this table shows.
The effect of vesting is given by the differences between the coef-
ficients for the vesting variables. "Some" over "no" vesting raises the
saving ratio by 1.5 percentage points (±0.9 at the .05 level) and "full"
over "some" vesting reduces the ratio by 2.1 (±1.0) points. Coverage
with no vesting and no contributions is 7.8 per cent and, compared
with 7.7 for the not-covered group (Table 4), indicates virtually no
recognition effect. When the amount contributed goes from zero to
3.3 per cent of pay, other saving rises by 1.5 percentage points; when
it rises further, other saving declines. A rise in contributions from
3.3 to 7.0 per cent of pay, for example, reduces other saving by 1.9
percentage points.




and so depends on C/P. When C/P is zero, the elasticity is 0.9; when
C/P is 3.3 per cent, the elasticity is zero; when C/P is 5 per cent, the
elasticity is —0.48. Other saving therefore first increases almost dollar
for dollar with contributions, but the increase falls to zero as contri-
butions approach 3 to 4 per cent of pay. Thereafter, contributions
substitute for other saving and do so by larger amounts as contribu-
tions rise further, the rate of substitution being about one-half when
the contribution is 5 per cent of pay.8 This is a strong effect, but, being
7 In addition, the midpoint offor the open-end contributory group may be too
low, which would make the slope of the regression steeper than it should be.
8 These figures probably understate the absolute magnitude of the income elas-
t.icity somewhat because the percentage contribution and the difference between
contributory groups is overstated (see footnote 4). On the other hand, the magnitudeRecognition and Substitution Effects 65
less than dollar for dollar, reflects the less-than-perfect substitutability
of pension funds for other assets. Unless the substitution is exactly
dollar for dollar, increased contributions will add to total personal
saving entirely apart from the recognition effect.
2. Inclusion of Employers' Contributions
Employers usually contribute much more than employees to group
pension plans (except chiefly in the case of government workers, who
make closer to one-half of the total contributions to their plans based
on current schedules). The size of the recognition and substitution
effects may vary with the amount of both contributions. The preced-
ing estimates of size explicitly took only the employee's contribution
into account, though they partly took the employer's into account in-
directly insofar as the amounts of the two contributions are correlated.
By ignoring the employer's contribution, however, the estimates of
elasticity could be overstated, especially if, as seems likely, the two are
correlated. We need to supplement the analysis with data on em-
ployers' contributions.
There are data on the growth of pension funds in the aggregate,
but none broken down for individual employees. Plans in which the
employer contributes a specified percentage of the employee's pay
check are unusual. In most industrial plans.employees have no direct
way of knowing even approximately their employer's contribution.
The employer incurs an obligation for specified benefits to a group of
workers, many of whom will later change jobs and not receive any
benefits, and the employer decides himself how much to lay aside to
meet his obligations. Typically he contributes to a fund set up on an
actuarial basis to meet his expected obligations, and no part can be
identified as providing for the retirement income of a particular em-
ployee except under group deferred annuity contracts. Estimates by
employees of their employer's imputed contribution are therefore
likely to be unreliable. At best the participant in most plans can be
may be overstated because the midpoint used for the open-end class may be too low
(see footnote 7). That the elasticity becomes a larger negative number as contribu-
tions rise is a consequence of using a quadratic rather than some other curvilinear
regression function. No test was made of alternative functions, so that this character-
istic of the elasticity may not describe the data accurately.66 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
expected to know the promised amount of his retirement income
(coming to him if he has or acquires fully vested rights), though most
may not have even this knowledge; variable-annuity plans do not
specify the benefits in terms of a fixed dollar retirement income,
although they do specify the employer's contribution.
For most households, therefore, the estimate of retirement income
under a plan (question 4) is likely to be more reliable than their esti-
mate of the total cost, and so it seems best to estimate the latter
indirectly from the former. This can be done from actuarial tables
with information on the retirement income, the age of the worker, and
the number of years covered by a plan.9 For example, a worker of 45
who has been covered fifteen years started his payments at age 30; his
pension contribution per $100 of monthly retirement income is $150.72
per year until retirement (assumed age 65), to be covered by his own
and his employer's contribution.
The total contribution to a pension fund, including in this way the
imputed contribution attributable to employers, can be calculated for
each sample household and expressed as a percentage of total reported
income. Because of deficient information, the estimate was computed
for only about half of the covered households analyzed in the pre-
ceding tables. Midpoints were used of the five-year intervals for age
and years covered and of the intervals for monthly retirement income.
9 The figures used were as follows, rounded to the nearest dollar. Level contribu-
tion paid annually in advance until retirement, for ages at five-year intervals be-
ginning at age 20, required to fund a pension of $100 per month for a male life
starting at age 65 (no refund on death either before or after retirement, interest
earnings ofper cent, and using the Group Annuity Table for 1951 with no
projection or age setback):
Age at Start











Lump sum at 65 0 12,761Recognition and Substitution Effects 67
Arbitrary guesses had to be made for the midpoints of the two open-
end intervals, years covered fifteen and over and monthly retirement
income $500 and over. The resulting error is likely to be especially
large for the older age groups.
With these estimates the average ratio of total contributions (by
employee and employer) to income is 6.5 per cent, which is seven-
tenths of the average ratio of other saving to income (9.1 per cent) for
these same households.
The 6.5 figure is only a rough indicator of total pension contribu-
tions because of numerous sources of error. It understates the cost to
the employee of a comparable private annuity and the actual cost to
the employer, because it excludes disability or death benefits, retire-
ment before age 65, declining mortality rates, part of the higher pre-
miums required for any increases in benefits coming after coverage was
acquired (past service credits),1O and loading charges (commonly 3 to
7 per cent of the premium) to cover administrative expenses. Increases
in benefits produce a downward bias in the estimate that rises with the
age of the worker. An offsetting bias is the overstatement due to ignor-
ing the turnover of workers. Employees without fully vested rights
who change jobs do not qualify for all the benefits attributable to
their employer's contribution. Whether the estimate is higher or lower
on the average than the actual total cost cannot be determined.
Although these biases distort the level of the estimated pension
saving for each household, they do so much less relatively to each other,
so that a grouping of the covered households -by the relative amount
of the total contribution given by these estimates should be tolerably
accurate. They are intended, not to show the total dollar growth in
pension funds (for which more representative data are available), but
to rank the sample households by the total imputed contribution to
their pension funds. From a breakdown similar to that of Table 14,
we can determine whether the recognition and substitution effects are
different by using the total rather than just the employees' contribu-
tion. Table 15 presents the figures. They show a recognition effect
when the total contribution increases from zero to around 5 per cent
10Thatis, the estimates assume that the particular benefit schedule in force at the
time of the survey had been in effect since the household was first covered.68 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
of income as well as when some vested rights are acquired, and a
substitution effect when the contribution (except for the some-vesting
column) and vesting go further. The differences in Table 15 are not
TABLE 15
Average Ratios of Total Other aSavingto Income of Covered






income) None Sons Full Groups
0 —2.9 8.6 9.7 8.3 8.8
3 —4.9 8.9 10.2 8.5 9.3
5 and over 8.5 10.2 8.0 9.1
a Excludingcontributions to group pension plans and social
security taxes.
b Same exclusions as Table 14 as well as households for which
total contribution could not be estimated (i.e., did not answer
questions 4 and 15C—see Appendix). Number of households,
arrayed in the same pattern:
457 239 177 873
653 445 250 1,348
1,246 1,177 513 2,936
Employee's and employer's contribution; estimated from age,
years of coverage, and expected ietirement income (see text foot.
note 9), and divided by family ihcome.
statistically significant, though they are all in a direction consistent
with the previous results.
Yet the effects are much smaller than in Table 14, based on em-
ployees' contributions alone. The elasticity of the substitution effect
from that table, as estimated by the regression function, was 50 per
cent at a contribution level of 5 per cent, and this was possibly an
underestimate (see footnote 8, above). A corresponding estimate of the
elasticity for Table 15 is 6 per cent.1' Although the maximum recog-
nition effect implied by the second row and column is not much smaller
UThis'was found by taking the change in the saving ratio horn the 3—49tothe
5-and-over contributory groups, averaged for the three vesting groups, and dividing
by the average change in contributions (that is, the difference between 4 per cent as
the midpoint of the 3—4.9 contributory group and the midpoint assumed for the
5.and-over group).Recognition and Substitution Effects 69
here than in Table 14, it mostly reflects the classification by vested
rights and hardly at all that by total amount contributed. The result
of including employers' contributions in the amount contributed,
therefore, is to reduce greatly the relative size of its effect.
In summary, the elasticity of the recognition and substitution effects
in these data is substantial for employees' contributions alone, but only
a twentieth or less when employers' imputed contributions are in-
cluded. Apparently the elasticity with respect to employers' contribu-
tions alone is close to zero.12
3. Length of Time Covered
Having found two factors—degree of vesting and amount contributed—
on which the recognition effect seems to depend, we are led to look for
Others. One possibility is the length of time a household has been cov-
ered by a plan. If the recognition effect reflects participants' awareness
of the costs and benefits of their plans, one might expect the effect to
increase over time. This is easily tested by classifying the covered house-
holds by how long they have been covered. Since the large growth in
group pension plans has occurred since World War II, a classification
by five-year intervals with an open-end class over fifteen years divides
the covered households into four groups of about equal size. The data
are so organized in Table 16.
Surprisingly, the table reveals no effect on saving of the length of
time covered. The saving ratio neither rises with this period, which
would indicate that the recognition effect increases over time, nor falls,
which would indicate that the substitution effect increases over time.
Nor do such changes appear in the subsample of ages 50 and over. The
small size of this subsample subjects the ratios to large random vari-
ability, but the average for the two subgroups enclosing zero to nine
years of coverage shows the absence of any systematic tendency for the
saving ratio to rise or fall. The analysis in Chapter 3, Section 4, found
that length of time covered and age are only moderately correlated in
this sample; otherwise we should expect the ratios to rise with length
of time covered as a reflection of advancing age, since the saving ratio
12 Since the measures of contribution in Tables 14 and 15 have different denomi-
nators, they cannot be subtracted to obtain the employer's imputed contribution.
Hence wecannotdirectly compare the separate effects of the employers' and em-
ployees' contributions.70 Effect of Pension Plans on Aggregate Saving
does rise with age. The absence of high correlation between time cov-
ered and age is perhaps surprising; presumably it reflects the newness
TABLE 16
Average Ratios of Total Other aSavingto Income of Covered














10 to15 years 8.2 9.8
Over15 years 9.2 9.6
a That is, excluding contributions to group pension plans and
social security taxes.
b Same exclusions as for Table 6 as well as households not
reporting length of time covered. Number of households in rows
1to 4, respectively: 1st col., 2,991, 2,065, 1,406, and 1,497; 2nd
col., 227, 197, 296, and 692.
of pension plans and will be less true of samples drawn in future
decades. In any event, there is no evidence that the passage of time
produces marked changes in the response of saving to pension cover-
age. And this is true for a sample composed of people above average
in education and income. For this reason these conclusions seem ap-
plicable to the total population of this country in the near future.
Conceivably a falling and rising tendency both exist and just offset
each other to account for the observed constancy. This possibility can-
not be ruled out, though it seems implausible. It does not show up in
cross classifications of length of coverage by occupation or amount
contributed (not presented). Another possible explanation for this re-
sult is that even fifteen to twenty years is insufficient to produce the
reaction to pension coverage that may come in two generations or so.
In that time everyone will know people at first hand who have had a
plan during their working life and have enjoyed its benefits during
retirement. Such palpable evidence of how these plans work may per-
haps evoke a stronger response to coverage—though whether to enhance
the recognition or the substitution effect, or both, Cannot be said. At
present the recognition effect appears to depend only on degree of
vesting and amount of contribution (chiefly by the employee himself).